

Software Security for Mobile Devices

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The RS³ Certifying App Store


- ▷ **vision:** user-centric, semantically justified security for Android devices
- ▷ **approach:** integrate security technology into an app store for Android
 - a single solution for multiple security concerns
 - accessible to the end user of a mobile device
 - providing explicit security guarantees
 - supporting user-defined security policies



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|---|---|
| static information-flow analysis | dynamic enforcement |
| ▷ before installation | ▷ at run-time |
| ▷ ensures confidentiality of sensitive user data | ▷ prevents unwanted behavior of applications |

Static Analysis


- ▷ **certification** of information flow security before installation of apps
 - notion of security formalized by a noninterference property
- ▷ two approaches to **static analysis of bytecode**
 - type-based and PDG-based
- ▷ **soundness** of the type-based analysis proven
 - w.r.t. formal operational semantics and the notion of security



- ▷ **proof-carrying code** principle used by the type-based analysis
 - allows to shift main workload to server
 - without including it in the trusted computing base

Dynamic Enforcement

- ▷ **enforcement** of usage control policies
- ▷ **instrumentation** of applications before installation
 - by inlining of policy enforcement points (PEPs)
 - intercept critical events and enforce decisions at run-time



- ▷ **central decision-making** by a single policy decision point (PDP)
 - enables enforcement of system-wide policies
 - enables exchange of policies without changing controlled apps

RS³

“Software Security for Mobile Devices” is one of the three reference scenarios of the nation-wide research program “Reliably Secure Software Systems” (RS³) funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).


The vision of RS³ is to initiate a shift to a property-centric view on software security based on semantically well-founded approaches.

For more information, visit:

<http://www.reliably-secure-software-systems.de>

Architecture

- ▷ **client-server architecture**
 - security technology integrated on both sides



Prototype

- ▷ **policy editors** aid the user in specifying his security requirements
 - selection of categories of sensitive data to keep confidential
 - instantiation of generic policy templates restricting the behavior of apps
- ▷ **visualization** makes information flow in apps transparent to the user



- ▷ **simple** to set up and use
 - client app runs on off-the-shelf devices
 - server-side part runs on conventional web servers

Evaluation

- ▷ initial evaluation on self-developed **case studies**
 - core functionality of existing third-party apps
 - check whether problems are found/prevented
- ▷ recently: evaluation on **third-party apps**
 - from the F-Droid open-source app store
 - investigate how technologies scale
- ▷ **example:** “Tea Timer”
 - provides countdown timers
 - is allowed to read identity and write to SD card
 - concern: identity may be leaked to SD card
 - IF analyses guarantee absence of potential leak



next goal: provide useful guarantees for more third-party apps to user

Selected Publications

- ▷ S. Lortz, H. Mantel, A. Starostin, T. Bähr, D. Schneider, and A. Weber. Cassandra: Towards a Certifying App Store for Android. In *Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices*, pages 93–104, 2014.
- ▷ M. Mohr, J. Graf, and M. Hecker. JoDroid: Adding Android Support to a Static Information Flow Control Tool. In *Proceedings of the 8th Working Conference on Programming Languages*, pages 140–145, 2015.
- ▷ S. Rasthofer, S. Arzt, E. Lovat, and E. Bodden. DroidForce: Enforcing Complex, Data-Centric, System-Wide Policies in Android. In *Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security*, pages 40–49, 2014.